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DEDICATION IN MEMORY OF
WILLIAM DEWEY ROLLISON, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF LAW EMERITUS
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
1897-1971
Introduction
William D. Rollison was born in Bloomfield, Indiana, July 1, 1897. He
graduated from Lyons High School in 1915 and served in the Army (private,
Motor Transport Corps) in World War I. In 1918, he became the principal of
Towner High School in Towner, North Dakota.
He left high school teaching for the legal profession and was admitted to
the Indiana Bar in 1919. He earned both the A.B. and LL.B. degrees at Indiana
University and, in 1922, joined the law faculty, as an assistant professor, at the
University of Alabama. He was a co-founder and early editor of the Alabama
Law Journal.
Profess6r Rollison left Alabama for Harvard and further law study; he
earned his LL.M. in 1930 and joined the Notre Dame Law Faculty as an instructor. He was promoted to assistant professor in 1933, associate professor in
1936, and professor in 1945. One of his first assignments at Notre Dame was as
faculty advisor to The Notre Dame Lawyer. He was responsible for the review's
first thorough reorganization; it was under his guidance that the Lawyer became
a quarterly publication.
His years at Notre Dame were years of busy teaching-of virtually every
course in the curriculum--of steady scholarship, and of innovation. He was one
of the first in the nation to reorganize the wills-trusts-future-interests area into a
single, integrated course. His two-volume Cases and Materialsin Estate Planning
(1959) was among the first casebooks to cover all three traditional fields.'
He was a popular campus figure and a witty, learned classroom performer.
In 1947, the Notre Dame Law Club decided, for the first time in its history, to
specially honor one of the faculty. The guests of honor were Professor and Mrs.
Rollison; the occasion was Mass and Communion breakfast. The choice of guest
was a tribute to Professor Rollison's popularity, and the choice of occasion a
tribute to the ease and comfort with which this gentle Protestant made himself
a part of Notre Dame. It was the Rollisons' twentieth wedding anniversary, and
the Professor's twenty-fifth year as a law teacher. In 1949, he received the University's Lay Faculty Award for distinguished service.
Professor Rollison was active in the South Bend community during all of
his years at Notre Dame. He was a well-known figure at the Bar, a founding
member of the South Bend Estate Planning Council, a contributor to and
member of the South Bend Round Table (an erudite discussion society), and
active in the Knife and Fork Club and the Lions Club. He was also a member
of the American Bar Association, Gamma Eta Gamma, and Phi Alpha Delta. He
is listed in Who's Who in Indiana, Who's Who in CentralStates, Who's Who in
Law and Who's Important in Law.
1 He had already published, in 1939, his widely-used treatise on wills, and had contributed an array of law-review pieces in that field. See Appendix.
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Professor Rollison retired from the faculty on August 31, 1963, to continue
teaching as Distinguished Professor of Law at the Cumberland Law School of
Samford University, in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1969, as a part of the Law
School's one-hundredth birthday, he received the LL.D. degree from Notre
Dame.
At Cumberland, he continued to write, to teach, and to inspire young
lawyers. He was a vibrant member of that community until his death there on
January 21, 1971. Someone once unkindly suggested that his distinguished and
curly white hair was evidence of age and decline. Many of his students remember
his answer: "Although there is snow on the roof, there is a fire in the hearth."
Mrs. Rollison survives and is living in Birmingham. She is a gracious and
helpful resource in the preparation of this dedication. Several of us who were
his students at Notre Dame, and who followed him into the full-time teaching
profession, have contributed our memories of him, and our tribute, to this dedication issue. I was his student in 1960-61, the third year in which he taught in one
course all of the field I was later to teach in his place. I remember him as a
teacher who enjoyed the classroom and those who shared it with him, as an
exacting and calm scholar, and as one of those special Notre Dame law teachers
whose office was a comfortable place for small (and large) talk-and even, in
his case, a place to smoke a free cigar.
He was a gentle, gracious lawyer and teacher and a proud part of the Law
School's growth in wisdom and grace in the 33 years he was here. For some
reason my most vivid memories of him are in the library, puffing on an illegal
cigar in the reading room; and behind his desk in the classroom, saying a quiet
prayer before we all plowed into ten pages on the rule against perpetuities. The
smiling picture that begins this issue somehow fits both images. He was a happy,
mildly irreverent scholar, and a reverent, happy teacher.
Thomas L. Shaffer2

Rollison as an Old-Fashioned Law Teacher
Since I graduated in 1960, and did not return to the faculty to teach until
1964, I missed the opportunity of working with Professor Rollison as a colleague.
I was privileged to know him only as a student, but fortunate nonetheless.
When Dean O'Meara came to the Law -School, he got the idea that wills,
trusts and future interests should be taught as one integrated, functional course,
called "Estate Planning," and he assigned it, naturally enough, to Rollison.
Professor Rollison, with characteristic thoroughness, then produced his own set of
materials, and our class was one of the first to use them.
Rollison was an old-fashioned kind of teacher. For him, the purpose of a
law school was to impart knowledge, not to remake the world or end a war in
Vietnam, and the primary purpose of a student was to acquire, not judge that
knowledge. Professor Rollison, however, was no mere master tradesman in a
trade school. Rather, he was a master craftsman who embodied, in a special sort
2

'61L; Dean, Notre Dame Law School.
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of way, a philosophy of law and life that has largely gone out of style, though
if I read them right, a lot of kids today are much closer to Rollison than they
know. My kind of liberal in my day-can 1960 be so long ago?-arrived at
law school when arguments over New Deal measures and McCarthyism were
still the stuff of constitutional law. The civil rights'movement had hardly begun,
and draft counseling was unheard of.
Rollison's course, oriented as it was, was not one of the "in" courses; we
tended to gravitate to the young Turks on the faculty, who had Harvard or
Yale teaching-cards of more recent vintage. Professor Rollison's course in estate
planning, in contrast, began with one practical question-what is the law?-and
ended with another-how do you use it to'draft or advise? My kind of liberal
saw the law as an instrument for refashioning the world into the good society by
the implementation of sound social policy. Rollison instead saw the law as something that kept the government in its place, leaving time for an individual to
work out his own destiny, accumulate a little something, and then pass it on to
his family. He knew, too, that the government could do evil as well as good,
and that all things considered, it would probably do the latter. How many times
did I hear him say--"That smacks of Statism !"-when one of us suggested a
different rule might work a "sounder social result." Rollison seldom objected to
the result as such, but he always saw, as we often did not, the danger in letting
the law undertake to make over society in a judge's image of "sound social
policy."
I think, too, that to have had a course under Rollison, with his white hair
and courtly manner, must surely have been much as it would have been to have
studied under Holmes himself. Holmes, of course, was a New England Yankee
and Rollison was from the South, but there was little to distinguish in how the
two men viewed the law.
To know what the law is, Holmes said somewhere, you, have to know what
it has been and what it is tending to become. Like Holmes, Rollison was not
reluctant to ask those who studied the law with him to read the ancient texts for
themselves and to master their learning, although of the 480 cases reported in
his materials, 86 were decided within the ten years of the date when we used
his materials, a feat not always easy to accomplish in wills, trusts, and future
interests.
Holmes told us that, "A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his
conduct is within the rules,"3 and that is the perspective from which Professor
Rollison taught. How many times did I hear him say, "It doesn't make any
difference what you are trying to do and how dose you come, if you are still this
side of the line." He came about as close as you can to teaching the law with the
kind of neutral principles that operate the same for good men and bad men. He
would have had to put up with a lot of abuse from some of the committed generation for his "failure" to make his witness manifest in what he taught, though,
again, I feel his inherent dignity would have turned back most, if not all, of the
lack of manners so characteristic of some of our children. And I know that our
children, too, as they matured, would have come to see more wisdom in Rolli3

0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 110 (1881).
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son's philosophy than seemed to be there then when our guys had the five votes
and "they" had only four. Neutral principles of law make terribly good sense
to the individual making his way in even today's world, and sometimes they
require a special sort of commitment and entail a special sort of courage that is
not always visible to the young. Professor Rollison did not pen them, and I never
heard him quote them, but these words of Mr. Justice Story say a lot that I know
he tried to teach:'
Whenever legislation renders the possession or enjoyment of property precarious; whenever it cuts down the obligation and security of contracts;
whenever it breaks in upon personal liberty or compels a surrender of
personal privileges, upon any pretext, plausible or otherwise, it matters little,
whether it be the act of many or the few, of the solitary despot, or the
assembled multitude; it is still in its essence tyranny.
I can't say yet that they express my philosophy, but I understand and respect
these thoughts more now than I did in 1960 when I was in one of the last of
Professor Rollison's classes in estate planning at the Law School. Like good wine,
Rolison seems better with age.
G. Robert Blakey5
Memorial to Professor William D. Rollison
In February, 1971, the legal profession and the teaching profession lost one
of its greatest men in the person of Professor William D. Rollison. I knew
Professor Rollison when I attended the University of Notre Dame during the
years of the Second World War in 1942 through 1944. The memory of a
tall, serious-looking gentleman walking through the corridors of the Notre Dame
Law School is very vivid in my memory and those of my classmates. We met Mr.
Rollison, who was our torts teacher, and our criminal law teacher. He seemed
to be so profound, so serious, and yet so intense on teaching the various subjects
to the freshman law students that he could not help but impress one as being a
very fine forthright teacher. This became more evident as we progressed into
the varying subjects. As law students, we were all afraid of most of our teachers,
but in Mr. Rollison's case, we seemed to have a great deal of respect, as well as
fear. He seemed to know so much about the subjects and he seemed to be trying
so hard to see that we understood, not only the particular subject, but also the
background which made up the law and the reasons for the law in the particular
subjects.
He would sit slightly forward, bent over the desk, and with a booming voice
would hammer home the points of the law. As the semester wore on in the
freshman year, we still could not quite fathom Mr. Rollison. He seemed to be so
deep in the subject that we could not quite follow him all of the way.
Then, one day in criminal law, we had just finished the subject, "robbery,"
and the next chapter in the book was devoted to the crimes of rape. Mr. Rollison
turned the page to the chapter and, in a very deep voice, said "Gentlemen, we
J. STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 447 (1852).
5 '60L; former Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedure, United States Senate.
4
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now turn to rape; however, since you are all experts in the subject and have
read the chapter, we will now skip the chapt& and we will turn to the chapter
on murder." The twinkle in Mr. Rollison's eye was the dead tip-off that here
was a teacher who not only had sincerity and a deepness of his subject, but also
a very, very living sense of humor. The response in the class was a momentary
lapse of complete silence and then the entire class burst into laughter. It was
true we had all read the chapters on this particular crime and had read them
well prior to our ever coming to them in the class on criminal law. Mr. Rollison,
knowing law students to be what they are, and with his sense of humor, had
gotten the point home to us very, very well.
This is an example of the great humor which this man had and as we
learned to know him better in school, we found that this sense of humor was
something which always tempered Mr. Rollison in his relationships with the
students. Whenever a student got too serious with himself or with his subjects,
so that it was hurting his understanding of a subject, Mr. Rollison could always
insert an aside of humor with which the student would get himself back in proper
perspective.
Mr. Rollison was not only a great teacher, but he was also a profound
research man. His work on wills still stands in my library as one of the useful
tools in drawing wills and handling estates.
I also remember an incident of Mr. Rollison's about his understanding of
human nature. As seniors in the Law School, we had the first opportunity to
put the Law Ball on in the Rockne Memorial. It was the first dance to be held
in the Rockne Memorial during World War II. A class of only five seniors was
rather small for the dance, but we wanted to make it a success. We, therefore,
had to skip quite a few of our classes in order to work on the ball and get the
place decorated. I can remember one morning when Mr. Rollison went to the
class and there were only two students present. He inquired as to where the rest
of the class was and someone reminded him that they were working on the Law
Ball. Mr. Rollison said, "I believe I will walk down to the Rockne Memorial to
see how the decorations for the Law Ball are coming. Would the rest of the
class care to join me?" In this way we did not get charged with cuts, but we
had Mr. Rollison present on the Rockne Memorial floor giving us help and
guidance in trying to get the Law Ball ready. The dance was a success and Mr.
Rollison and his lovely wife were part of the faculty which were honored at that
particular time.
I also remember an incident after I graduated from the Law School which
involved the beloved William D. Rollison. He appeared in my office one day
and seemed to be quite upset that a local cleaning establishment had ruined his
wife's dress. Mr. Rollison had gone into the cleaners several weeks before and
had taken his wife's dress for cleaning. When he picked up the dress, they had
charged him a $1.49, and upon getting home, he found the dress was completely
ruined by some substance which the cleaner had used. The dress had holes in it
and its colors had faded and it was a complete loss. Mr. Rollison wanted the
cleaners sued. Being just in the practice of the law, I carefully started to draw
a complaint which was based on the negligence of the cleaner. Mr. Rollison read
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over the complaint and then, in a sly way, suggested that maybe a second count
could be inserted in the complaint, namely, breach of contract. He stated
that his theory was that he had made a contract with the cleaner to clean that
particular dress for a charge of $1.49. He stated that the cleaners had not kept
the contract and had breached the contract by returning the dress in the damaged
condition. I agreed and we inserted a second count on breach of contract.
When the trial of this case was held in one of the local courts, Mr. Rollison was
the principal witness. We went through the entire case, Mr. Rollison testifying as
to the facts as they occurred. The cleaner put on a perfect defense to the charge
of negligence, namely, that they had used all reasonable means in cleaning the
material and that the material apparently was not as it had been shown to Mr.
Rollison to be and, therefore, that the entire matter was one of negligence and
that they were not negligent of any handling of this garment. At the conclusion
of the trial after both sides had rested, we merely pointed out that there was a
contract made and, regardless of the fabric involved with the dress, the cleaner
had not returned the dress in a good and clean condition. The court held for
Mr. Rollison and awarded a judgment of $35.00. Mr. Rollison was very pleased
with the verdict in this case and said that this was another example of how to
put two theories to work in one complaint.
When Professor Rollison returned to Notre Dame as part of the centennial
program, and was awarded his Doctor of Laws degree, it recalled very vivid
memories to me and to my classmates, because here was not only a great
teacher, not only a great man, not only a humanitarian, but a man with a great
sense of humor who had interest in those he taught. Mr. Rollison will be missed
in the legal profession, but he will also be missed as a teacher who had the understanding of his students at heart. Notre Dame can be proud that William D.
Rollison was a Professor of Law in its Law School. He contributed much to its
greatness.
Charles M. Boynton'

William Dewey Rollison-An Authentic Law Professor
Legal education as it is traditionally carried on in the United States is one
of the most successful educational experiences yet developed for inculcating
professional attitudes and competence. Through it persons gain an understanding of, and commitment to the legal process, a fairly sophisticated ability to
analyze legal problems, and a good grasp of the art of advocacy, as well as some
knowledge of legal principles and procedures. These are gained through the
expenditure of a great amount of time and effort by teacher and student, particularly in the first year where what is traditionally known as the case method of
study is more rigorously carried out. It has succeeded and will continue to succeed because of teachers like William Dewey Rollison.
Bill Rollison was an authentic teacher. He had the utmost respect for his
students, for the educational process, and for the institution of law. He was a
6

'44L; Lecturer in Law, Notre Dame Law School.
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master of his field, a tireless researcher, and a skilled classroom teacher. He
treated students as coparticipants in the learning process, expecting them to
responsibly prepare substantial amounts of material for consideration in class.
Glass was the time to probe and to synthesize, to jointly discover what the
materials meant. His approach forced to the surface questions concerning the
fundamental justice of legal rules and decisions and questions concerning the
feasibility of concrete application of legal rules and concepts to everyday life.
His no-nonsense attitude was occasionally mistaken for harshness, a sentiment totally alien to his character. His door was always open to studentsfirst, because to him students were important; second, because he considered
these more personal legal discussions to be a vital part of the educational process.
Finally he was a gentleman, automatically considerate and helpful.
Bill Rollison respected the legal educational process. He considered that he
and it were doing something important. He took pride in being part of the
process whereby professionally trained graduates of the Law School took their
places as practicing lawyers in all parts of the country. He felt this imposed a
weighty responsibility on the Law School to see that students were properly
prepared to fulfill the duties of a lawyer. While all law faculty members share
these time honored sentiments to a greater or lesser extent, to know Bill Rollison
was to know how deeply he was committed to them.
He also respected the openness of the legal educational process. Politically
a conservative, he respected the differing views of all members of the faculty and
student body. In his quiet, gentlemanly way, he did as much to inculcate respect
for civil liberties and individual freedom as the most zealous reformer. He
believed deeply in the conservative way but held in even higher regard the
value of an open legal educational process.
Finally, Bill Rollison had respect for the institution of law. His work was
strong in both theory and application. The depth and comprehensiveness of his
library research in wills are legendary. At the same time he was active in the local
and state Bar and played a major role in the modernization of Indiana probate
law and practice. We would hope that all community service efforts are motivated by concern for the community rather than self-aggrandizement. There
never was any question about this with Bill Rollison. There was never any doubt
his concern was for the improvement of the institution of the law to which he
effectively and selflessly devoted his life.
Successful legal education doesn't just happen. It happens because of
teachers like William Dewey Rollison.
Thomas F. Broden, Jr.'

A Remembrance of Professor Rollison
The scholarly contributions of Professor Rollison axe undoubtedly cate7 '49L; Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Urban Studies, University of
Notre Dame.
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gorized elsewhere, and attest to his reputation firmly established among those
in the field in which he labored.
It is to his influence as a professor that we, his former students, are qualified
to offer testimony. As Henry Adams said, "A teacher affects eternity; he can
never tell where his influence stops."
The teacher of law is not inferior in rank to the scholar, because the law
school is necessarily more than its library.
The spirit of a law school is really the common presence of the faculty,
and during our tenure the impact of Professor Rollison on the spirit of the school
was not to be doubted.
It may be stated without smugness by a graduate of ten years that the law
student is without a sense of history. His legal education begins with the stripping
away of the layman's half-truths and misconceptions, but is soon given over to
recent cases and legislation, proposed reforms and present-day problems. The
inevitable impression is one of rapid transition-the majesty of the law seems to
rest not on past achievements or tradition, but solely on its utility today or
tomorrow.
In this seeming tempest of change, the firm figure of Professor Rollison was
real evidence of the force of tradition-no mere Mr. Chips provoking an unexamined nostalgia, but a vital force with roots in the past, analyzing the
present, anticipating the future. And while time may dim the memory of detail,
it compensates by providing a different clarity through affording perspective.
What seemed unthinkable during our tenure under the Dome has come to
pass-a Notre Dame Law School without Professor Rollison.
Where a sense of history was otherwise in short supply, Professor Rollison
was history. The rich tradition of law and legal scholarship seemed bound up in
one man, and the assurance of its continuity evidenced by the strength of his
presence.
A remembrance such as this would be seriously lacking if it did not acknowledge the warmth and approachability of Professor Rollison, whose door seemed
always open and whose ear was ever available. The news of his passing is sure
to evoke countless individual memories of his personal kindnesses.
Thank you, Professor Rollison, for so much of what was a Notre Dame
legal education.
Gerald M. Gallivan8
Tribute to a Friend
Although he was truly a scholar and an academician who had a remarkable
talent for conveying the essence of the law to his students, Professor Rollison will
be best remembered by many of us for the continued interest and concern that
he had for the individual student and his accomplishments. This personalized
interest began in law school, but it continued throughout the legal career of his
proteges. We have lost a real friend.
Edward 1. Gray'
8
9
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About the Teacher William Rollison
...

in the manner of Legal Realism10

"He was stimulating because of the antibodies he aroused."' 1
This remembrance is highly personal in telling how I, as one student, saw
and experienced the teacher William Rollison. Some of his other admirers will
explore, I am sure, his large corpus of published materials to assay their contribution to the law. Others can do it more competently, since estates and wills, where
Rollison was an established expert, is not my abiding intellectual interest. But as
a teacher, I am interested in the fine craftsmanship of a fellow teacher like
Rollison. Therefore it is fitting for me to try to bring alive his personality as a
teacher. He was a distinctive, powerful operator in the classroom. Decades of
students were well instructed, and more importantly, many of them were challenged to higher levels of autonomous probing and reaching-which is the highest
compliment for a teacher.
How did he do this? He combined a vast knowledge of the law (witness the
books he carried to class, crammed with notes, yellowed clippings, tear sheets et
al., almost unmanageable in their bulk) with a highly distinctive style of thoughtvalues and manners. He could grip the students' attention, especially new ones
gathering for the first meeting of the torts class, a course he taught for many
years and one of my favorites. New people are always confused, and the title
"torts" is not helpful in giving a fellow an inlding of what to expect. Contracts,
jurisprudence, legislation, criminal law, the rest of our first-year fare, are familiar
categories. Torts, however, was very important, or so the scuttle-butt went."
So imagine a large class, seventy or eighty students filling up the seats, and oozing
good thoughts about doing well. (For some of us, this resolution was like that
of the confirmed party-goer, the morning after, who promises too much.)
In the center of this room on a high plafforn sat Professor William Rollison,
quietly fingering the edges of his much-used casebook.- He peered at us, as we
straggled in, through strikingly business-like glasses. This tall thin figure with a
generous shock of white hair once or twice smiled at us-like a man who had
observed this scene many times before,. not bored with it but genially wise to the
low-keyed theatrics of a first meeting with new law students. Then he began, I
recall, an exposition on the spectrum of human frailties we call torts. It is a dismal list, extending from flying arrows over somebody's land, to planks dropped
into the hold of a ship, to a dynamiter causing a nuisance, and on and on. He
spoke with a deep, steady voice, and occasionally he would rise to an important
point by almost barking it out. He would then pause, and grin slowly and
deliberately, almost as if to say: "Do you see the importance of that point?
10 During the summer of 1971, as I am writing this memorial paper, I am also re-reading
a number of papers clustered around the theme of Legal Realism, i.e., Holmes, Pound, Nelles,
Jerome Frank, and especially Karl Llewellyn. Their thinking and style of view will be apparent,
although, of course, any errors are my own.
11 FELix FRANKFURTER REMrNscEs, as recorded in talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips 36

(1960).

12 The rumor was that there were two critical courses, contracts and torts. If one mastered
these, the rest would be, comparatively, a snap. This.is probably good advice. Although I
must admit I did not find the remainder that easy; certain areas of law are still a mystery.
Peace, as to the question of my mastery of these two fields.
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Mark it well! Do you agree?" If we were supposed to respond, we failed him.
We were the greenest of greenhorns. We would not have interrupted this Legal
Mind to mention that the building was on fire.
Of course, each one of us will remember a particular vignette about him
that will "capture" somehow what William Rollison meant in our individual
lives. It is highly personal exercise. As Polanyi puts it "...

into

every act of

knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is
being known."13 For instance, if you had asked me that first day: "Can you
learn from this man?" I would probably have answered in the negative. He was
too old, too prim, too conservative and too Texan. (I will explain this allusion
to Texas. Each student, I believe, brings an immense amount of luggage, or
attitudinal conditioning-to use the more technical term-to the classroom. In
1952 when I first met Professor Rollison, it was the year my great hero, Adlai
Stevenson, was running for the presidency. I was a stalwart Stevensonite, New
Dealer and Northern Liberal. These caused me to wonder about Rollison. I
thought he was from Texas because he looked and acted as I thought Texans
did! To my mind, this automatically signaled conservatism and obstructionism
to my wing of the Democratic Party. Rollison wasn't a Texan, and I did learn so
much from him, mea culpa! Election years are not good times for the clinical
approach. This error in first impression has not stopped me from making these
judgments; albeit with better success I hope.)
Regardless of my initial misperceptions and apprehensions about Professor
Rollison, he presided in that class with authority and effectiveness. You could
almost hear the swirling of minds, struggling for order and mastery: "What did
he say about trover?" "Does he like this decision?" "Where did he get that
point?" Outside the classroom, we were haunted enough to explore further, to
get it down right, or in my case, to find counterarguments for such "obviously"
outdated views of self or society as "plainness, character, honesty, hard work, selfreliance, innocence, goodness and not necessarily knowingness." 4 Or as Frankfurter said of one of his highly dogmatic teachers: "He was stimulating because
of the antibodies he aroused."1
What was Rollison's dogmatism? Where does he fit, given the different
schools of jurisprudence and style of working with the law? Let me propose
a "fit," although I hesitate to encapsulate a long and fruitful intellectual life so
neatly. My summer mentor, Karl Llewellyn, describes a legal attitude that I
find helpful in trying to explain Rollison. It is Llewellyn's famous Formal Style,
the orthodox ideology of a few decades ago:
That picture is clean and clear: the rules of law are to decide the cases;
policy is for the legislature .... [and the legislature is the "enemy invaders"].
Opinions run in deductive form with an air or expression of single-line
inevitability. "Principle" is a generalization producing order which can and
should be used to prune away those "anomalous" cases or rules which do
not fit. .
13
14
terms
15

.

. to prune away anomaly is to vindicate Principles: large-scale

POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOwARD A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY vii

(1957).

See REIcH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 24 (1970), which, of course, are descriptive
used by Professor Reich to paint his picture of the Consciousness I person.
Supra note 1.
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Order [Good Order is Consciousness I, which is private property, hard work,
thrift, personal virtue, freedom from Washington, etc.] ....
[What would
be the Ideal Judge?] And it is a good judge's business to steel himself
against emotion, and against deflection by sense or sense of justice which
may run counter to "the law," lest such should lead him to neglect of his
stem duty....-For me, this is how I recall Rollison, and it was this Weltanschauung that I
reacted against. I do not imply an outright rejection, for the process of learning
is more complex than the simple dualism of acceptance or rejection. If, of course,
we are talking about autonomous learning and not blatant indoctrination on one
side or muddled subjectivity on the other. The person trying to learn must dig
and probe into the matter, going beyond his initial judgment or bias, and those
of his teacher, too.
Martin Buber gives an example of what I mean by going beyond the
"simple dualism of acceptance or rejection." He wants an interaction with the
ideas of another, the dialogic model. Buber makes the setting of his example a
drawing class, but it is, I believe, appropriate to all teaching, including the law
classroom:
The teacher of the "compulsory" school of thought [about how to draw]
began with rules and current patterns. Now you knew what beauty was,
and you had to copy it; and it was copied either in apathy or in despair.
The teacher of the "free" school places on the table a twig of broom, say, in
an earthenware jug, and makes the pupils draw it. If the pupils are quite
unsophisticated, soon not a single drawing will look like another. Now the
delicate, almost imperceptible and yet important influence begins-that of
criticism and instruction. [Emphasis mine. Source of "criticism and instruction" would be fellow students, books, other courses, and most importantly,
the Professor. We students did argue heatedly on the landing outside the
door of the library and in the student lounge.] ... . In the former instance
the preliminary declaration of what alone was right made for resignation
or rebellion; but in the latter, where the pupil gains the realization only
after he has ventured far out on the wa:y to his
achievement, his heart is
7
drawn to reverence for the form, and educated.'
Professor Rollison respected our views, but respect never led to passivity about
telling us where we were wrong. Buber suggests that the teacher, using an
"almost imperceptible, most delicate approach," might signal a disagreement
with a student's position by "raising of a finger, perhaps, or a questioning
glance."'" Rollison's style was not quite that inhibited. He came on much
stronger, but I never felt intimidated. He had too much confidence in his position to need the psychic subsidy of browbeating. A few times, however, I was
badly battered by the strong winds of the logic, which grew out of his Formal
Style.
Let me give an illustration of "dialogic" learning that I experienced by confronting and interacting with the ideas and style of William Rollison. In the
LLEWELLYN, Tnn COmmON LAw TRADITIoN-DEcr01NG APPEALS 38, 39 (1960).
17 Buber's address, "Education," given in 1925, reprinted in the collection of Buber's

16

writings, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 88.
18 Id. at 89.
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Palsgraf case,19 my sentiments were all for Mrs. Palsgraf. She was an innocent
person quietly waiting for her train in a harsh complex of a city. She was not
well-to-do, which fitted nicely with my "socialistic" tendencies. Wealth should
be used to compensate a very productive society's victims. In addition to my
social policy arguments, I thought I could extend the business invitee rule, to
impose an insuror liability on the Long Island R.R., as one of its costs of doing
business. Clearly, however, it was my New Deal mentality with its socialization
of risks that monopolized my feelings about this case."0 Professor Rollison, as I
recollect, liked Judge Cardozo's conclusion, at least in this case; but he went to
his own social policy arguments. Certainly they were different from mine. Let me
try to restate them as I remember them:
Is it fair to impose liability for an unanticipated consequence of helping a
man to catch a moving train? Some consequences we can impose the duty
to anticipate: he might fall; he might hurt somebody while jumping on; or
he might drop and ruin his package; but not that the package dropped con-,
tained fireworks, which exploded, causing the weighing machine at the other
end of the platform to strike Mrs. Palsgraf. [Up to this point, his analysis
is pretty traditional. It is when Rollison moves into deeper justification,
parrying the insurance-New Deal thrust, that we can see his world-view of
the good life and justice.] The law should impose only duties that our
reasonable man can handle. We want to encourage a certain level of foreseeability, and not go beyond. To do otherwise would be illogical and unfair.
Men ought to be free from rules that make them liable, even though they
have done nothing unreasonable. Punish them when they fail in their
reasonable duties, but not more than that.
Professor Rollison never convinced me with his line of reasoning or his social
values. But he did unsettle my certainty. For a time I was enamored by the
elegance of his intellectual construction in this case and others. How clear and
tidy it all was; this must be the way the legal mind operates. Such aberrants as
impersonal social forces, harsh urban complexes, socialization of risks, welfarism,
be damned! I was tempted to accept his views of society and law, but my
"upbringing" was too indelible. He never gave up expounding his views, and he
certainly provided me, and my classmates, with alternatives to the new Conventional Wisdom. For this, and also for his genuine interest in us, we are deeply
in his debt.
John W. Houck2
19 Palsgraf v. The Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). A male passenger carrying a package ran to jump aboard a subway train pulling away from the platformf
A platform guard and the train conductor assisted the man onto the moving train. In the
rush and excitement, the man's package was dislodged and fell on the tracks. It contained
some type of fireworks, which exploded with considerable force, and toppled a weighing
machine on Mrs. Palsgraf. She was waiting for her train to go to Rockaway Beach.
Is the Railroad liable?
20 While a student at the Notre Dame Law School, I was encouraged, after determining
the facts of a case, to work out my own solution and reasons, then to find out what the court
actually decided and why. It is more meaningful, it helps the memory, to record the court's
rule and its reasoning, for examination purposes. But, more importantly, to practice one's own
legal thinking and reasoning, and comparing the results with that of the court's, this sort of
note making helps the student learn how to think autonomously and legally.
21 '55L; Professor of Management, University of Notre Dame.
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Tribute to Professor William D. Rollison
When our class first entered the Law School in 1956, we had little idea of
what scores of Notre Dame graduates already knew about Professor Rollison. He
was teaching only seniors then and we were much too occupied with absorbing
our first and second year professors to discover what was in store. But, undirected, the impressions filtered in. The tall, solemn figure, the vest, the bow tie,
and the white hair moving quietly at any hour to and from the office to the
rear of the law library. Often, if we did not see him, we could tell from the
lingering trace of his cigar that he had just passed by. Professor Elton Rechter,
in his freshman contracts class, might now and then mention Professor Rollison
in such a way that we sensed the deep respect and mutual friendship of the two
men. Without thinking, we already knew that here was a true legal scholar who
was at home with the law and with Notre Dame. We did not yet realize the
depth of this truth or the other dimensions of the man. As we entered his senior
courses we assumed they would be dry and technical and covered with the dust
of history and death. The hornbook, Rollison on Wills, was there to greet us,
and with its uniqueness ground down by the demands of legal style, there was
little warning to expect much other than the long hard work of legal learning
under an old man who would be resting upon his legal laurels and doctrines. We
found out differently. Although at the sundown of his career, Professor Rollison
was engaged in the monumental task of translating the subject matter of wills,
trusts and estates, and estate taxation, into functional teaching materials for
the student of estate planning. There was no guaranteed royalty for this
prodigious effort; we were the only direct beneficiaries. Along with this comprehensive overhaul of form into substance, Professor Rollison was generously
responding to the challenge of the problem method that had been posed by Dean
O'Meara.
Through Professor Rollison's initiative, live client families were brought in
and the class was set up as a law firm to plan their estates. In retrospect, this
was all the more remarkable since it occurred ten years before it became fashionable in law schools to secure special financing for experiments in clinical education. To our further surprise, beyond the classroom, Professor Rollison showed
genuine enjoyment in exploring at great length with students any subject from
politics to the fortunes of the Notre Dame football team to fishing in northern
Minnesota. Simultaneously, there was a more significant, gradual revelation.
Professor Rollison taught estate planning as a study of human psychologynever in a heavy-handed, ideological way, but with a wry sense of humor and
suggestive questioning that brought forth a whole range of self-discovered insight.
The deep-felt human need to be immortal by extending control from the grave,
the tender illusion of precatory language between husband and wife, the sibling
rivalry at work in will contests, all revealed themselves under his gentle prodding.
He was not a cynic, but he did have a healthy skepticism about human motivation
which emerged not in bitter commentary but in quiet deflation of human
pretension. This wisdom, hard won through a lifetime of studying human
behavior, he imparted in an art form which cannot be duplicated by the law
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and social science methodology of today. Borrowing from a popular song of the
day, we came to know him as "Rolly-Pop." It is a name which a decade later,
in the age of the generation gap, might be mistaken for disrespect. For us it was
a shorthand symbol of our deep affection for him.
John E. Kennedy2

William Dewey Rollison
No teacher in the recent history of Notre Dame Law School so richly mixed
scholarship, warmth, and the joy of living as did William Dewey Rollison., Attending classes during the turbulent days following Pearl Harbor, we students
were constantly amazed at the breadth of Bill's interest. Although his first love
was the law of wills, he moved with equal facility into adminstrative law, military
law and, later, estate planning. In a typical class day he would mount the podium
with numerous books under his arm and a sheaf of yellow cap notes which "outlined" word for word the lecture of the day. As the bell rang, he began reading
the notes in a somewhat droll, staccato voice very highly pitched. After a few
minutes of this, he would lift his head gently, look out at the class, smile, and
begin a teasing series of questions aimed at the author of the opinion read, or at
a recent law review commentary on it, or at one of his own sometimes sleepy
students (one of whom later became the first Governor of Alaska). Point made,
he would brush back his silver hair, lower his head and begin reading anew from
those famous yellow sheaves. Quick to puncture pomposity, Bill saved his longest
needles for the Eastern establishment. A native of Alabama, he would say:
"People in New York think the world ends at the Hudson River-they have a
broader view than the boys at Harvard Law who think it ends at the Charles
River." Himself a Harvard law graduate, the Professor took great fun at
spoofing, and always with a broad smile.
Of the law professors under whom I have studied, I believe Professor Rollison
had the greatest single influence on my professional career. He taught me to
enjoy the sometimes dreary routine of legal research by comparing it to a treasure
hunt for ideas and cases. He taught us patience with the legal process. He taught
us to comment critically, but never negatively. He showed us the importance
of the outline in writing either a paper or a law review article or a book. He
made the law come alive and in this way he truly touched us with his fire of
enthusiasm for law as a way of life.
I shall never forget when later, as Dean of the Law School, I phoned Bill
in Alabama to tell him our faculty had voted him an honorary Doctor of Laws
degree, to be awarded him on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the
school. There was a long silence and finally he replied: "God has been good to
me, Bill, and so has Notre Dame. Thank the faculty from the bottom of my
heart." He received the degree and thrived on his final homecoming with us.
William Dewey Rollisonr by his scholarly writings, his strong influence on
his students and his sense of mission in life, will continue to inspire Norte Dame
22

'59L; Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
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legal scholars for generations to come. A gentle giant has passed. Indeed, God
has been good to Notre Dame in sending him our way.
William B. Lawless"
Rollison the Teacher
Students usually regard professors not as human beings but as characters,
performers, role-players. As I remember it, my classmates and I cast Professor
Rollison as the stereotypical scholar: bookish, dry, abstruse, a slow talker who
carefully measured his words, intellectually remote, not fully aware of what was
going on in the world around him, even in the classroom. We were awed by the
fact that he had published books, but that fact reinforced the stereotype.
He looked the part. I remember him as tall, with distinguished white hair
and a scholarly stoop, the very image of a professor. I see that image stalking
the library reading room and the stacks, laden with books and bits of paper with
notes. As I visualize his office, it was piled high with books and seems to have
been, for some reason, dimly lit. There was always the smell of cigar smoke; he
was addicted to cigars.
I remember that he taught torts to my class and that we thoughi the subject
impenetrable under his teaching. Negligence, in particular, baffled us. I was
much surprised to discover, a few years later, that I knew a good deal about
negligence. How did he do it? Wills, which he also taught us, seemed to us at
the time to be a more successful teaching endeavor; we were aware of some communication between him and us. Still the dominant view among the students
was not of a human being but of a professor with a rasping voice who put hard
questions and harried us into giving the appropriate responses.
What was the reality? He was a serious, dedicated teacher and scholar.
He was generous with his time. He put in long hours at the Law School and
was always available to us if we wished to talk to him outside of class. I was in
his office many times, discussing torts and wills, but also other matters. Those
hours were an important part of my legal education. He was an intellectual,
and he enjoyed intellectual engagement. I was the fortunate beneficiary of that,
even though I was not fully aware of its value at the time. Without his influence,
and that of Harold Gill Reuschlein and Anton-Hermann Chroust, I would have
been much less aware of the possibility that the study of law could also be an
intellectual adventure. Even for the great majority of my classmates who went
on to practice and to public service, he dignified and elevated our conception of
what we were studying and what we were going to do with our lives when we
left Law School.
I would add one further point about Professor Rollison. My classmates
and I, like all law students before and after us, judged the faculty who taught us.
Our judgments were categorical, often cruel. But at bottom we divided our
teachers into two groups: those whom we respected and others. We respected
23 '44L; former Dean, Notre Dame Law School; member of the New York Bar.
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Rollison. I would like to think that he knew that and derived some satisfaction
from it.
John Henry Merryman

Teache , Counselor, Colleague, and Friend
Few people have contributed so much to the image of law school, and to
the formulation in its students of a deep sense of professionalism and of commitment to excellence, as Professor William D. Rollison. Bill Rollison-teacher,
counsellor, colleague and friend. I knew him in each of these categories during
my years at Notre Dame. And in each of them he contributed immeasurably to
the role and the ideals of my life. In retrospect and from the view of the apprehensive indifference of a law student, he was a scholar, and a gentleman. He
could be interrupted at any time-during the regular week, evenings or on weekends-as he worked in his office. From my view as a fellow member of the
Notre Dame law faculty, Bill Rollison was a great man. He was a good teacher;
he was a scholar of demonstrated capacity; he was a ready counsellor; and for
those who dared penetrate the veneer of gruffness and solitary effort, he was a
close friend. But he was more than that. He gave without reservation of himself for his profession, for the Notre Dame Law School, and for each of the students who labored under him and with him. Rollison, Richter, and Manion
were the triumvirate that for years projected the image and provided the continuity of the Notre Dame Law School. It is sad that the full import of their
contributions is not recognized until death.
Robert E. Sullivan"
Professor Rollison's students whose tributes do not appear here include: George
A. Pelletier, '63L, Associate Dean, School of Law, Southern Methodist University;
David T. Link, '61L, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; James S.
Casey, '61L, School of Business Administration, Western Michigan University;
John Speca, '52L, Professor of Law, University of Missouri, and Robert J.
Affeldt, '5 1L, Professor of Law, University of Toledo.
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'46L; Dean, School of Law, University of Montana.
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APPENDIX
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM DEWEY ROLLISON
BOOKS
THE LAW OF WILLS

(1939).

WILL CLAUSES ANNOTATED

(1946).

ILLINOIS ESTATE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ESTATE PLANNING (two
FORMS

FOR WILLS AND

(1952).

volumes) (1959).

(with Elizabeth D. Eshelman)

ESTATE PLANNING

(1967).
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

(1970).

ARTICLES
Estate Planning-An Integration of Wills, Trusts and Future Interests, 34 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 294 (1959).
Course in Estate Planning at Notre Dame, The, 36 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 315
(1961).
History of Estate Planning,The, 37

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

160 (1961).

Co-Ownership of Property in Estate Planning, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 608
(1962).
Some Modern Problems in the Evolution of Estate Planning, 25 ALA. LAWYER
260 (1964).
Some Modern Problems in Estate Planning, 27 ALA.LAWYER 92 (1966).
Some Modern Problems in Estate Planning, 27 ALA. LAWYER 402 (1966).
Post Mortem Estate Planning, 28

ALA. LAWYER

398 (1967).

Commentary on the Uniform Probate Code, 29

ALA. LAWYER

427 (1968).

Commentary on the Uniform ProbateCode, 30

ALA. LAWYER

206 (1969).

Commentary on the Uniform Probate Code, 30 ALA.
New Look at Old Law in Estate Planning,31

LAWYER

ALA. LAWYER

334 (1969).

88 (1970).

